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must be made by petition, stating that the applicant is a resident of the
county, and giving the cause for which the change is sought.6
In the absence of fraud an application for change of name should be grant-
ed. 7  But in one instance, petitioner's allegation of "un-Americanism", as his
reason for desiring change, had to be stricken from the petition before it would
be granted. s This seems to be rather technical. Without a showing of fraud
the court should offer a speedy and recorded change of name- any name of
the petitioner's choice. 9
D. M. DELABARRE.
RIPARIAN RIHTS - INLAND WATERS - RIGHT OF AN OWNER OF LAND ABUT-
TING ON INTER-TRAcT LAKE TO THE USE OF THE ENTIRE SUIRFACE. - Plaintiff
brought an action to enjoin the defedant from constructing and maintaining a
fence through and across two lakes and from taking water fron one of the
lakes for irrigation purposes. The trial court found that the waters overlying
each owner's portion of the lake heds were the private property of the owner
and subject to his exclusive control. It further found that the defendant's use
of the lake water for irrigation was reasonable. On appeal, the Supreme
Court of Minnesota reversing the judgment in part held that the plaintiff was
entitled to an injunction against the defendant who had erected the fence
across the lake. Johnson v. Seifert, 100 N.W.2d 689 (Minn. 1960).
Title to the unmeandered, intertract land in controversy was conveyed to
Minnesota by the Swamp Land Act.1 An individual may be vested with a
fee simple title to this subaqueous land.2 The English rule that non-navi-
gable lake bottoms are susceptible of private ownership has been applied in
most jurisdictions.3 In the jurisdictions recognizing private ownership, it has
been held that an owner of a segment of the lake bed was restricted to the
use of the water overlying his land while he pursued the usual recreations of
6. N.D. Rev. Code § 32-2802 provides: "Any person desiring to change his or her
name may file a petition in the district court of the county in which such person may be a
resident, setting forth: 1) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of such county
for at least six months . . . 2) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name
is sought; and 3) The name asked for .. "
7. See In re Ross, 8 Cal.2d 608, 67 P.2d 94 (1937); In re Slobody, 173 N.Y. Supp.
514 (Sup. Ct. 1918); Bates, Change of Name, Legitimation, and Adoption, 19 Tenn. L.
Rev. 418 (1946); Note, 26 Calif. L. Rev. 268 (1938); Note, 24 Tul. L. Rev. 496 (1950);
Comment, 16 N.C. L. Rev. 187 (1938).
8. In re Cohen, 142 Misc. 852, 255 N.Y. Supp. 616 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
9. See Petition of Buyarsky, 322 Mass.. 335, 77 N.E.2d 216, 218 (1948); In re Slo-
body, 173 N.Y. Supp. 514 (Sup. Ct. 1918).
1. Swamp Land Act, 9 Stat. 519 (1850), 43 U.S.C. § 982-988 (1958) "To enable
the several States . . . to construct the necessary levees and drains, to reclaim the swamp
and overflowed lands therein-the whole of the swamp and overflowed lands, made unfit
thereby for dultivation, and remaining unsold on or after the 28th day of September,
A.D. 1850, are granted and belong to the several States respectively . . ."
2. 43 U.S.C. § 983 (1958) "... at the request of the governor of any State in
which said swamp and overflowed lands may be, to cause patents to be issued to said
State therefor, conveying to said State the fee simple of said land."
3. Crutchfield v. F. A. Sebring Realty Co., 69 So.2d 328 (Fla. 1954); Bannon v.
Logan, 66 Fla. 329, 63 So. 454 (1913); Sanders v. DeRose, 207 Ind. 90, 191 N.E. 331
(1934); State Game & Fish Commission v. Louis Fritz Co., 187 Miss. 539, 193 So. 9
(1940); Walden v. Pines Lake Land Co., 126 N.J. Eq. 249, 8 A.2d 581 (1939).







This conclusion is a literal extension of
the common law theory that an owner exercise absolute dominion over his
property.'
When the Federal test of navigabilitys is applied, if waters were navigable
in Minnesota at the date of its admission to the Union, the absolute riparian
ownership will be set at the high water mark.9 However, if the waters are
non-navigable under the State and Federal test,' 0 the riparian proprietor owuns
to the center of the lake.11 This right exists as a natural and inherent incident
of the ownership of riparian land. The use of the water is limited to what is
reasonable, and necessary for the use and enjoyment of the property, and is
not to be employed to the detriment of other riparian proprietors.1 -'
In the instant case the court adopted the liberal attitude,'5 holding that the
riparian owner has the right to the use of the entire surface of the lake. This
right is to include fishing, boating, swimming, and other uses, both domestic
and recreational, to which our lakes are ordinarily put in common with other
abutting owners. 14 This right of property in water is usufructuary. 1 5 and as
such consists not of the water, but to the advantages of its use. The land-
owner retains the right of private ownership of the subaqueous land, subject to
a common usage of the water by all abutting riparian owners.
The court is to be commended for its definition of the respective rights of
the owners. For centuries reasonable men have adhered to a mode of social
intercourse which permitted, even demanded, a reasonable sharing of the
4. Sanders v. DeRose, supra note 3, at 333 "... each owner has the right to the free
and unmolested use and control of his portion of the lake bed and water thereon for boat-
ing and fishing . . ."
5. Taylor Fishing Club v. Hammett, 88' S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) (the
owner has the exclusive right to boat and fish in the water area over his land).
6. Commonwealth Water Co. v. Brunner, 175 App. Div. 153, 161 N.Y.Supp. 794
(1916) "... no right to fish, boat, bathe, -or do any other act in or upon any part of
said lake under which they do not own the land."
7. See Smoulter v. Boyd, 209 Pa. 146, 58 A. 144 (1904).
8. State v. Adams, 251 Minn. 521, 89 N.W.2d 661, 664 (1957) "The rule is that
streams which are navigable in fact are navigable in law; that they are navigable in fact
when they are used or are susceptible of use in their ordinary and natural condition as
highways for commerce; that ordinary and natural conditions refer to volume of water,
and gradients, and the regularity of flow; and that a waterway otherwise suitable for
navigation is not barred from that classification merely because artificial aids must make
the highway suitable for use before commercial navigation may be undertaken."
9. Hanford v. St. Pai & Duluth R. Co., 43 Minn. 104, 44 N.W. 1144 (1890); State
v. Korrer, 127 Minn. 60, 148 N.W. 617, 623 (1914). "In this state it has been settled
for nearly 50 years that the title of the riparian owner extends to low water mark. While
the title of a riparian owner in navigable or public waters extends to ordinary low-water
mark, his title is not absolute except to ordinary high-water mark. As to the intervening
space his title is limited or qualified by the right of the public to use the same for pur-
pose of navigation or other public purposes."
10. State v. Longyear Holding Co., 224 Minn. 451, 29 N.W.2d 657 (1947) (deter-
minable as of date of admission to the Union, and under Federal decisions with reference
thereto).
11. See Rooney v. Stears County Bd., 130 Minn. 176, 153 N.W. 858 (1915).
12. See Beach v. Hayner, 207 Mich. 93, 173 N.W. 487 (1919).
13. Improved Realty Corp. v. Sowers, 195 Va. 317, 78 S.E.2d 588 (1953); Snively v.
Jaber, 48 Wash.2d 815, 296 P.2d 1015 (1956) (where several owners held land border-
ing a non-navigable lake, boating, fishing, and other similar rights were owned in common
and any proprietor or his licensee could use the entire lake).
14. Harris v. Brooks, 225 Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d 129 (1955); Taylor v. Tampa Coal
Co., 46 So.2d 392 (Fla. 1950).
15. Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, 11 Cal.2d 501, 81 P.2d 533, 560 (1938), " . . .
the riparian does not 'own' the water . . . , he 'owns' a unufructory right-the right
of reasonable use of the water . . ."
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waters. Free access to the surface of the lakes of Minnesota is desirable if
the development of trade common to such areas is to be exploited.
1 6
ROBERT D. HARTL.
SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS - RULES AND REGULATIONS - REASONABLE-
NESS AND VALIDITY. - The Board of Education, prior to the 1958 school term,
adopted a rule which barred married high school students from participating
in co-curricular activities. In a mandamus proceeding by the parents of mar-
ried high school students to compel the board of education to allow the
students to play football, the trial court held that the defendant school district
did not violate the statute guaranteeing to all students an equal right to public
educational facilities. The Supreme Court of Michigan, in a 3, 1, 4 decision,
held that the judgment be affirmed. Four judges supported the contention
that the rule, which is admitted to be punitive, is violative of public policy in
attacking the married status of these students as "wrongdoing". Three judges
contended public policy does not favor marriages when consummated under
the ages of twenty-one for the male and eighteen for the female, and that the
rule is reasonable as being within the general discretionary powers of the
school board. The remaining judge affirmed the decision but only on the
ground that the question was moot. Cochrane v. Board of Ed. of Mesick
Consol. Sch. Dist., 103 N.W.2d 569 (Mich. 1960).
As a general rule decisions of school boards affecting the good order and
discipline of the school are final when they relate to the right of pupils to
enjoy school privileges.1 Courts are not concerned with errors of judgment,
2
.but the reasonableness of regulations is a question of law for the courts des-
pite the presumption that such regulations ate a reasonable exercise of dis-
cretion.3 Whether a rule is reasonable is subject to inquiry by the courts,
4
and they may compel, by mandamus, the directors of a school to admit a
pupil unlawfully excluded.9
It has been held that to expell a student from school because of marriage
is an abuse of a school board's discretionary power.
t There is no doubt a
student may be punished for a breach of discipline, or for an offense against
good morals, but not for innocent acts. 7 An act penalizing the conduct of
16. Duval v. Thomas, 114 So.2d 791, 795 (Fla. 1959) Wherein the count took
judicial notice of "tourism" and calculated that immeasurable damage would result if
guests were restricted to fishing and swimming only in the waters within a host's property
lines; State v. Adams, supra at note 8.
1. See Batty v. Board of Education, 67 N.D. 6, 269 N.W. 49, 50 (1936).
2. See e.g., State v. Walker, 88 Ga. 413, 76 S.E.2d 852, 855 (1953).
3. Burkitt v. School Dist. No. 1, Multonomah County, 195 Ore. 471, 246 P.2d 566,
576 (1952)
4. Kinzer v. Directors of Independent School Dist., 129 Iowa 441, 105 N.W. 686, 687
(1906).
5. Perkins v. Ind. School Dist. of West Des Moines, 56 Iowa 476, 9 N.W. 356
(1880).
6. Nutt v. Board of Education, 128 Kan. 507, 278 Pac. 1065 (1929); McLeod v. State,
154 Miss. 468, 122 So. 737 (1929). But see, State v. Marion County Board of Educa-
tion, 202 Tenn. 29, 302 S.W.2d 57, 58 (1957) (masried student was expelled for re-
mainder of term with the right to return the following term); Kissick v. Garland Independ-
ent School District, 330 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) (Practically the same factual
situation was evident in this case as in the instant case. The court found that re-
stricting the privileges of a married student was not an abuse of discretion).
7. Perkins v. Ind. School Dist. of West Des Moines, 56 Iowa 476, 9 N.W. 356 (1880).
See also 35 Cyc. 1135, ". . . it has been held that a rule is not reasonable which will
deprive a child of school privileges except as a punishment for a breach of discipline or an
offense against good morals . . ."
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